Siting Hazardous Facilities: Lessons from LNG by Kunreuther, H.C. & Lathrop, J.W.
SITING HAZARDOUS FACILITIES: LESSONS FROM LNG 
Howard Kunreuther and John W. Lathrop 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
RR-82-36 
November 1982 
Reprinted from Risk Analysis , volume 1(4) (1981) 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed before 
publication. However, the views and opinions they express are not necessarily those of the Institute or 
the National Member Organizations that support it. 
Reprinted with permission from Risk Analysis 1(4):289-302, 1981. 
Copyright© 1981 Society for Risk Analysis. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by 
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or 
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright holder. 
iii 
FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has undertaken a study of 
the use of risk analysis in siting liquefied energy gas facilities in four countries: the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
work on which the present paper is based was part of this larger study. 
The authors of this paper have devised a descriptive framework for the issues raised 
by siting large-scale technological facilities, and have illustrated its concepts by applying 
them to an LNG siting process in California. They also suggest ways of using analytical 
methods to improve both the interaction process among the interested parties and the 
outcome of the siting debate. 
Their ideas are in the spirit of the research that IIASA is presently carrying out on 
the role of analysts in the policymaking process. Thus, this paper not only contributes to 
the Institute's work on the problems of risk but also has somewhat broader implications. 
ALECM.LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Received February 9, 1981 - Revised November 30, 1981 
This paper develops a descriptive framework for siting large scale technological facilities such 
as liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, and suggests ways of using analyses to improve the 
process. A key feature of these problems is that they involve relatively new technologies where 
there has not been a long history with which to construct a statistical data base. Hence the 
interested parties will each have different estimates of the probabilities and losses associated 
with events that affect the environment or safety of the population. The decision-making 
process can be characterized as a sequence of decisions, subject to change over time, which 
are influenced b)' exogenous factors and new legislation. Each of the separate decisions 
involves an input phase and an interaction phase. The input phase specifies the relevant 
alternatives and attributes associated with a particular decision. The interaction phase focuses 
on the nature of the conflicts between the different parties in evaluating the alternatives. 
Conflicts are often difficult to resolve because each stakeholder in the process has his own 
objectives, a limited information base shaped by these objectives and scarce computational 
resources. We illustrate the above descriptive framework through a case study of the LNG 
siting process in California. The paper then explores possible ways of improving the input 
and interaction phases through more structured analyses. Specific attention is given to the 
role of decision analysis, the analytic hierarchy process, examining assumptions, and the use 
of interactive computer models for scenario generation. The paper concludes by suggesting 
future research needs on jesigning policy instruments for helping to reconcile conflicts 
between the vying interest parties. Promising areas for more problem-focused research include 
the role of insurance and compensation schemes. 
KEY WORDS: Siting; decision processes; conflict; use of analysis; low probability events. 
Society has become increasingly concerned with 
the appropriate procedures for evaluating projects 
which promise to yield long-run benefits, but also 
create potentially catastrophic consequences. Recent 
examples of such problems are the siting of energy 
facilities such as nuclear power plants or liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) terminals. 
reached in the United States. On the basis of this 
descriptive model, suggestions are made for improv-
ing the process. The paper thus is designed to in-
tegrate descriptive aspects with prescriptive recom-
mendations. 
Section 2 details the elements of a descriptive 
framework for siting large-scale facilities. A key fea-
ture of the process is the interaction of interested 
parties, each of whom have specific goals and objec-
tives, a limited information base shaped by these 
objectives, and scarce computational resources. 
This paper has two principal purposes. Utilizing 
recent theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
literature on choice under uncertainty, it proposes a 
descriptive framework as to how such decisions are 
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Section 3 illustrates the framework with empiri-
cal evidence from the LNG siting decision process in 
0272-4332181 / 1200-0289$03.00/1 © 1981 Society for Risk Analysis 
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California which has been studied extensively [see 
Ahern,<1> Deutsch,(2) Linnerooth,(3) and Lathrop<4l]. 
Section 4 indicates how we might improve the current 
decision procedures, recognizing that the political 
decision-making process is based on a number of 
institutional and legal constraints which may be dif-
ficult to change. The concluding section suggests 
future research needs with respect to developing 
policies for reconciling differences between interested 
parties in the siting debate. 
2. A DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK OF 
SOCIETAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
2.1 Relevant Concepts 
In contrast to most textbook analyses of decision 
making under uncertainty, where there is a 
well-specified set of probabilities of certain events 
occurring and potential gains or losses from them, 
the problems discussed in this paper involve more 
fundamental uncertainties. For one thing, there has 
not been a long history with which to build a statisti-
cal data base. The technologies are relatively new and 
in many cases past experience provides us with limited 
guidance as to the chances of severe accidents oc-
curring. In a similar vein one has to speculate as to 
what the losses might be should a particular 
catastrophic event occur in a given location. These 
two elements of uncertainty represent a challenge for 
both risk analysis and decision-making. 
On the analysis side there is a need to systemati-
cally estimate probabilities and consequences from 
both past data and judgmental studies. There is an 
extensive literature from controlled laboratory experi-
ments over the past decade which have uncovered a 
set of biases and heuristics that individuals utilize in 
dealing with low-probability events [Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein,C5l Tversky and KahnemanC6l]. Other 
studies have suggested that the context in which a 
problem is framed plays a key role in how people 
make their decisions [Tversky and Kahneman, (7) 
Hershey, Kunreuther, and SchoemakerC8l]. These 
findings, partly due to computational limitations on 
the part of individuals, present a challenge to the 
analyst who would like to improve the decision-mak-
ing process. 
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An attempt in this direction has been taken by 
Fairley(9l who provides a detailed set of guidelines 
for estimating " small" accident probabilities based 
on a consideration of catastrophic risk analyses for 
LNG marine transportation. His motivation for sug-
gesting systematic analyses is that there is a great 
danger that many sources of an accident will other-
wise be omitted. In addition, there are numerous 
opportunities for bias with respect to judgmental 
estimates of accident probabilities when there is not a 
long history of past events. Similar reasoning would 
apply to the analysis of losses from a given accident, 
such as a major breach of an LNG tank. 
On the decision-making side , the lack of a de-
tailed data base implies that different interested par-
ties will have different estimates of the probabilities 
and the losses that guide their own judgments. We 
will look at the process in terms of a scenario involv-
ing a number of different decisions, which taken 
together resolve a particular problem. Some of the 
decisions may be solved in parallel by different par-
ties; others may be dealt with sequentially. 
The decentralized and sequential nature of the 
process are key concepts which guide the descriptive 
framework. March< 10l characterizes this process as 
one of limited rationality, whereby individuals and 
groups simplify a large problem into smaller pieces 
because of the difficulties they have in considering all . 
alternatives and all information. Support for these 
concepts at the level of governmental, firm, and 
consumer decision-making comes from several 
quarters. Lindblom< 11 l and Braybrooke and 
Lindblom,<12l emphasize the incrementalism in deci-
sions made by bureaucracies where there is a tend-
ency for government agencies to " muddle through" 
by making small changes from the status quo rather 
than attempting to structure and solve a larger prob-
lem. Cyert and March,<13> in their classic study of the 
behavorial theory of the firm, demonstrate empiri-
cally that organizations decentralize decisions and 
attend to different goals and objectives at different 
times. Bettmann< 14l integrates findings from a number 
of studies on consumer choice which suggest that 
individuals simplify the decision-making process by 
decomposing the problem, utilizing limited search 
and behaving sequentially with appropriate feedback 
loops. 
Another important concept, which also relates to 
the uncertainty of information on probabilities and 
losses, is the importance of exogenous events in in-
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fluencing the decision process. Random events, such 
as disasters, play a critical role in triggering specific 
actions to "prevent" future crises. The small data 
base for judging the frequency of low probability 
events, coupled with systematic biases of individuals 
in dealing with concepts of chance and uncertainty, 
increase the importance of a sali.ent event in the 
decision-making process. Tversky and Kahneman< 15l 
describe this phenomenon under the heading of avail-
ability, whereby one judges the frequency of an event 
by the ease with which one can retrieve it from 
memory. The importance of past experience in in-
fluencing insurance purchase decisions against low 
probability events [Kunreuther et ai.< 16)) reflects this 
characteristic of human behavior. 
March and Olsen< 17l suggest that random events 
and their timing play a critical role in many organiza-
tional decisions because of the ambiguity of many 
situations and the limited attention that can be given 
to any particular problem by the interested parties 
unless it is perceived as being critical. They provide 
empirical evidence to support their theory using em-
pirical studies of organizations in Denmark, Norway, 
and the United States. 
In a similar spirit Holling< 18l summarizes empiri-
cal evidence on how unexpected events played a role 
in the institutional response to environmental prob-
lems. Studies in five different areas of social or 
economic importance reveal that specific events (e.g., 
the destruction of forests by an outbreak of the 
spruce budworm) frequently generate surprise and 
trigger specific policies designed to cope with the 
resulting negative outcomes. 
With respect to legislative decision making, 
Walker< 19l notes the importance of graphically and 
easily understood evidence of trouble as an impor-
tance factor in setting the discretionary agenda of the 
U.S. Congress or a government agency. He also sug-
gests that the political appeal of dealing with a speci{ic 
problem is increased if it has an impact on large 
numbers of people. To support these points, Walker 
presents empirical evidence on the passage of safety 
legislation in the U.S. Numerous examples of this 
process are also provided by Lawless<20J through a 
series of case histories of problems involving the 
impact of technology on society. He points out that 
frequently: 
New information of an "alarming" nature is announced and 
is given rapid and widespread visibility by means of modem 
mass communications media. Almost overnight the case can 
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become a subject of discussion and concern to much of the 
populace, and generate strong pressures to evaluate and 
remedy the problem as rapidly as possible. (p. 16) 
In the case of decisions such as the siting of 
facilities, random events such as an LNG fire or oil 
spill may be sufficiently graphic and affect enough 
poeple to generate surprise and cause a reversal of 
earlier decisions, inject other alternatives into the 
process and change the relative strength of parties 
interested in the decision outcome. The mass media 
may play a critical role in focusing on these specific 
events and in many cases exaggerating their impor-
tance. 
2.2 Model Formulation 
The concepts discussed above have motivated 
the following descriptive framework of the facility 
siting process. A scenario consists of a sequence of 
decisions { D 1, ... , Dn}, which have to be made by 
different interested parties. In focusing on any partic-
ular problem, it is necessary to specify what the n 
different decisions are that comprise a particular 
scenario. For example, Lathrop<4l and Linnerootb<3l 
have constructed a detailed flow diagram of the dif-
ferent decision points with respect to the siting of the 
LNG terminal in California. Here the process begins 
with the Western LNG Terminal Company filing an 
application with the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) for terminal facilities. It continues through a 
set of interactions between federal, state, and local 
governmental agencies, special interest groups, and 
the Western LNG Terminal Company. In the case of 
nuclear power plant licensing decisions, Jackson and 
Kunreuther<21 J have constructed a scenario which 
emphasizes the decentralized nature of decisions by 
separate divisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission. The performance of a plant under a series of 
predetermined accident scenarios is a basis for the 
final decision as to whether or not to approve a 
power plant. 
These two examples suggest that, although one 
can look at a particular decision in isolation, it will 
be integrated with other actions by being depen<lent 
on earlier decisions (e.g., the case of LNG siting) or 
by being integrated at a later stage with other deci-
sions which are made independently of it (e.g., the 
licensing of nuclear power plants). 
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Previous Decisions 
EXOGENOUS 
FACTORS 
D1, ... ... ,Dj - l 
INPUT l PHASE .----..&.., 
'-----.:::::~ 
Evaluation of 
Attributes and 
Alternatives 
by Each 
Interested Party 
INTERACTION 
PHASE 
Nature of Conflicts 
Between Parties 
t = t + 1 
NO 
Final Action on Di ? 1---------~ 
YES 
Is this the Last 
Decision? 
YES 
END 
NO 
j =j + 1 
Fig. I. Descriptive model of choice for decision D1. 
Consider a particular decision, D1, (e.g., whether 
or not an LNG terminal is acceptable with regard to 
population risk), which is part of an overall scenario. 
Figure l depicts the relevant aspects of the process.2 
At any time period, t, there are a set of exogenous 
factors which limit the set of alternatives for consider-
ation. For example, a disaster may trigger specific 
legislation which provides restrictions on where a 
hazardous facility can be located. For each set of 
alternatives there are interested parties who enter the 
area. One set of alternatives then can determine the 
2 A more structured model for the siting process has since been 
developed at IIASA and is discussed in Kunreuther, Lathrop and 
Linnerooth (38). 
attributes (e.g., number of lives lost from an LNG 
fire) which are considered important by at least one 
of these parties. In Fig. 1 we refer to the relationship 
between these three components as the input phase of 
the process. Thus if one changes the composition of 
parties as well as the alternatives, one will also change 
the relative importance of attributes. For example, if 
special interest groups are concerned with a particu-
lar site, then the safety factor may be treated as much 
more relevant than if these parties do not have an 
input into the final decision. Similarly if certain 
attributes are specifically introduced into the picture 
by one of the interested parties, then this may cause 
other groups to play a more active role in the process. 
For example, if the federal government suggests the 
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critical importance of safety factors as part of the 
siting decision, then concerned citizens may unite to 
prevent their community from being chosen as a site. 
Each interested party is likely to have a different 
set of attributes that they consider to be important to 
the particular problem. Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee that two interested parties who focus on 
the same attribute will measure it in the same manner. 
For example, public interest groups concerned with 
the safety of potential sites may have a different 
estimate of the number of lives lost from a severe 
accident than the gas companies or the consortium 
proposing the project. Over time the nature and 
importance of these attributes may also change due 
to exogenous factors and a new set of alternatives. 
When it comes to the interaction phase, stake-
holders are likely to evaluate different alternatives by 
looking for satisfactory options rather than trying to 
find an optimal solution [Cyert and MarcH 13Jj. For 
each decision D1 there may be some level of a particu-
lar attribute that is deemed satisfactory, but that level 
may differ between interested parties. For example, 
public interest groups may specify an acceptable level 
of risk to be lower than the gas company proposing 
the project. As a result these two interested parties 
may have differing views on the acceptability of 
alternative sites even if they agree on the chances of 
an accident. When such conflicts occur, they may 
cause long delays in reaching a final decision because 
of the difficulties in resolving conflicts based on value 
differences. Eventually they may be resolved through 
some form of consensus by the interested parties, by 
court rulings or by governmental bodies with specific 
legislative powers to settle the controversy. For some 
problems no resolution may take place and the status 
quo is maintained. 
Looking at the interaction phase depicted in Fig. 
1, a central component is the nature of the conflicts 
between parties. If no final action is taken on a 
particular decision during period t because of a failure 
to resolve certain conflicts, this is treated schemati-
cally as postponing action until the next period. In 
period t + 1, a set of exogenous events may occur that 
substantially change the situation. The breach of a 
storage tank or the discovery of an earthquake fault 
may reveal certain features of facilities or sites 
which may make them unacceptable. These exoge-
nous events may change the relative importance of 
different interested parties and attributes. In addi-
tion, the events and the public's reaction to them may 
trigger new legislation which deem certain previously 
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satisfactory alternatives unacceptable and force a 
reevaluation of earlier decisions { D1, ••• , D1_ 1 }. 
To summarize, there is a set of decisions which 
have to be made over time as part of a scenario for a 
particular problem. There are laws and regulations 
which guide the acceptability of specific alternatives 
and there are different interested parties involved in 
the process. Because of the uncertainty regarding the 
probability and potential impacts of catastrophic 
events, interested parties with different goals and 
objectives and with limited computational capacities 
may have different estimates of the risks associated 
with specific actions (e.g., the siting of an LNG 
terminal at a particular location). Furthermore, ran-
dom events can have a major impact on the decision-
making process by triggering new legislation which 
may change the set of alternatives, relevant stake-
holders and attributes for consideration. Conflicts 
between these parties can lead to lengthy delays. 
3. THE LNG SITING DECISION IN 
CALIFORNIA 
The above descriptive framework outlined in 
Fig. 1 will be illustrated here by analyzing the deci-
sion process associated with siting an LNG terminal 
in California. This description will reveal implica-
tions of the structure of such a process concerning 
societal decision making for low probability events. 
We will first describe the nature of the problem, 
delineate the relevant interested parties and attributes 
perceived to be important, comment on the implica-
tions of this structure, and then discuss the role of 
exogenous events on the decision process. 
3.1 Nature of the Problem 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a medium for 
transporting energy that has the potential, albeit with 
very low probability, of creating severe losses. To 
transport natural gas over long ocean distances it has 
to be converted to liquid form at about -160°C and 
1 / 600 the volume. It is then shipped in specially 
constructed tankers and received at a terminal where 
it undergoes regasification and is then distributed. 
The entire system (i.e., the liquefication facility, the 
LNG tanker, and the receiving terminal and regasifi-
cation facility) can cost more than $1 billion to 
construct [Office of Technology Assessment<22l]. The 
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siting problem of interest consists of two principal 
decisions : whether the proposed LNG project is in 
the best interest of society in terms of its impact 
on the future U.S. energy mix (D 1) , and if so, whether 
the proposed site is appropriate in terms of meeting 
specific safety, environmental and economic criteria 
(D2 ). Note that the alternatives for D 1 are whether or 
not to have an LNG project, while those for D2 relate 
to proposed terminals at specific sites. 
3.2. Interested Parties and Relevant Attributes 
There is a set of interested parties associated 
with each of the above two decisions. Some of these 
parties are specified by law (e.g., government agen-
cies), others play a role because of specific concerns 
with the hazard (e.g., public interest groups), and 
others because of their economic interest in the pro-
ject (e.g., gas companies). In the case of D 1, there are 
three principal stakeholders, each of whom considers 
different attributes as important. The gas company or 
the consortium proposing the project considers such 
attributes as gas price and capital base as they affect 
its financial position, degree of control over the 
source, and supply security. 
The second party is the Department of Energy 
(DOE), which must ascertain whether the project is in 
the national interest.3 Two agencies within the DOE 
are involved: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC), which rules on site and project suitabil-
ity, and the Economic Regulatory Administration 
(ERA), which evaluates economic aspects of the pro-
ject and its effects on national energy supply security. 
Among the princip~ attributes that these two agen-
cies are supposed to consider are the security of 
supply, the proposed LNG price in relation to the 
price of alternative supplies, impact of the price 
schedule on conservation of energy, and whether the 
proposed site meets safety and environmental re-
quirements as stated in any national guidelines. 
[DOE/ ERA<23>]. The third principal party involved 
in D 1 is the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC), which has responsibility at the state level 
for issues similar to those considered by DOE at the 
federal level. 
In addition to these three parties, other agencies 
set safety standards for all proposed LNG projects. 
3 Prior to 1977 this responsibility resided with the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC). 
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The Office of Pipeline Safety Regulations (OPSR), is 
responsible for the landward side of the LNG termi-
nal, while the Coast Guard has jurisdiction over the 
marine side of the terminal, including ship move-
ments and the portion of the LNG system that 
connects the tanker to the storage system. 
The site-specific decision, D2 , involves some of 
the same parties as D 1, as well as additional groups. 
The set of relevant attributes are likely to differ from 
the ones related to the first decision. For example, the 
gas company now focuses on site-specific costs, 
accessibility of tankers, and where appropriate land-
use and environmental factors [OTA<22>]. The FERC 
examines site suitability with particular attention to 
environmental impacts and safety. 
Before 1977 the city and county governments 
had responsibility for evaluating local impacts of a 
project, while at the state level the California Coastal 
Commission (CCC) ruled on the impact of a particu-
lar site on the environment with special sensitivity to 
preservation of coastal natural resources. These 
agencies were required to hold public hearings in 
which all the parties had a chance to be represented, 
including special interest groups and local citizens 
groups concerned with safety and environmental im-
pacts. The California LNG Terminal Siting Act of 
1977 essentially removed local authority and central-
ized the state approval authority in the CPUC, 
changing the CCC role to determining a ranking of 
alternative sites. 
3.3. Implications of the Decision Process Structure 
The current LNG siting process illustrates two 
key features of multiparty societal decision processes. 
First, the decision is disaggregated in such a way that 
each agency focuses on a subset of all the attributes 
in comparing different sites. For example the CCC, 
which has a responsibility to preserve the environ-
ment, is now given authority to rank the proposed 
sites in California. The CPUC, which focuses on 
questions of supply reliability, has final authority on 
approval of the proposed site. This decision can be 
made more or less independently of the CCC rank-
ings. No single agency is now given a mandate to 
make trade-offs between environmental and energy 
supply concerns in considering the proposed site. 
The second feature of multiparty decision 
processes illustrated in the California case is the 
importance of the structure of that process. Where 
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there are conflicts of interest between different par-
ties, the most effective power normally lies with the 
agency in the position to make the final decision. In 
the case of California, a key question considered in 
drafting the LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977 was 
whether a conservation-minded group, such as the 
CCC, or an agency concerned with energy needs such 
as the CPUC, would have final siting authority. Once 
the CPUC was chosen, the final decision regarding a 
site was constrained in different ways than if the 
CCC had been given this authority. The dynamics 
and the structure of the process had a critical bearing 
on the final decision. 
But there are broader implications of the multi-
party character of societal decision processes for 
low-probability events. Conflicts among parties are to 
be expected, since each stakeholder implicitly assigns 
different importance weights to the relevant attri-
butes. Yet when one is concerned with low-probabil-
ity events associated with a new technology (e.g., 
determining the chances and consequences of a severe 
accident of an LNG terminal), the analyses 
marshalled by the conflicting parties are not based on 
statistical analysis and tested assumptions. Instead, 
the analyses must rely on subjective probabilities and 
choices of assumption sets from a wide range of 
defensible scenarios [Lathrop and Linnerootli24l]. The 
net result is that analysis does not play as important 
a role in such cases as it might if actuarial data were 
available on which to estimate probabilities and losses. 
Arguments concerning low-probability events 
often involve the concept of acceptable risk. While 
the definition of acceptable risk assumes many guises 
[Lathrop<25l], a procedure like the following is often 
employed: a detailed risk analysis of a proposed site 
specifies the chances of death per year ( p) from 
LNG-related accidents to an individual at risk. If pis 
below some threshold level, p*, then the project is 
considered safe; if p > p* then it is not. For example, 
the FERC estimated the values of p for three pro-
posed California LNG terminal sites as ranging from 
2 X 10-7 to 8 X 10-1. It pointed out that such risks 
are comparable to the risks from natural events such 
as lightning, tornadoes, and hurricanes, and con-
cluded: "The staff believes that this level constitutes 
an acceptable risk to the public" [FERC<26l].4 Yet of 
4 Keeney, et al. (39) utilize a particular p* in support of the 
acceptability of an LNG terminal in Matagorda Bay, Texas, 
They cite a rough criterion for risk acceptability of p = 10 - 1 
suggested by Starr ( 40), and compare it to their estimated p for 
the Matagorda Bay terminal of 2· 10-9. 
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course this form of argument does not in itself resolve 
safety debates, as the different parties can argue over 
what values of both p and p* are appropriate for the 
case at hand. 
3.4. Role of Exogenous Events 
Another implication of the decision process as-
sociated with facility siting is that exogenous events 
can play an important role in triggering new coali-
tions and frequently new legislation. Each interested 
party focuses on limited information and uses the 
data in different ways. Due to the difficulty of resolv-
ing stakeholder conflicts, a particular event can cause 
a reversal or reinvestigation of a particular decision if 
the case has not been finalized. Consider the follow-
ing four examples associated with LNG siting in the 
United States: 
1. In 1973 an LNG tank in Staten Island, New 
York, exploded and the roof collapsed burying 40 
workers. There was no LNG in the tank but it had 
seeped through the insulation and caused a huge fire. 
A result of this explosion was the increased concern 
with the dangers of LNG by Staten Island residents. 
The neighborhood organization called BLAST, which 
was formed a year before the accident, attracted 
considerable attention and interest because of the 
media coverage of the tank explosion. In the context 
of our descriptive model of choice, a new interested 
party played a key role because of a random event. 
What may have been a foregone deicison regarding 
the location of an LNG tank in Staten Island became 
problematical [Davis<27l]. 
2. The worst LNG accident occurred in 1944 
when the storage tank operated by the East Ohio Gas 
Company in Cleveland ruptured, spilling LNG on 
adjacent streets and sewers. The liquid evaporated, 
the gas ignited and exploded, resulting in 128 deaths, 
300 injuries, and approximately $7 million in prop-
erty damage. An investigation of this accident indi-
cated that the tank failed because it was constructed 
of 3.5% nickel steel, which becomes brittle when it 
comes in contact with the extreme cold of LNG. All 
plants are now built with 9% nickel steel, aluminum, 
or concrete and the storage tanks are surrounded by 
dikes capable of containing the contents of the tank 
if a rupture occurs. This example illustrates the im-
pact of a particular incident on the passage of new 
regulations.<27l 
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3. In December of 1976, the Los Angeles City 
Council voted to allow work to begin on an LNG 
terminal in San Pedro Bay. The following day an 
explosion ripped the oil tanker Sansinena in Los 
Angeles harbor leaving 9 dead and 50 injured. A 
week later the City Council commissioned a study as 
to the relative safety of the proposed site. They later 
approved the terminal. This explosion, although it 
had nothing to do with liquefied natural gas, alerted 
many Californians to the potential dangers of 
LNG.<27l 
4. Until the publication of several worst case 
scenarios in 1976 on the possible consequences of a 
$300 million terminal in Oxnard in California, there 
was general agreement by almost all stakeholders that 
Oxnard would be an acceptable site for an LNG 
terminal. At the time event the Sierra Club was in 
favor of this location. (They changed their feelings 
about Oxnard in 1977.) One worst case scenario 
indicated that a spill of 125,000 m3 of LNG from all 
five tanks on a tanker would cause a vapor cloud 
which would affect up to 70,000 people. Any resident 
could look on a map to determine whether the cloud 
covered his own house [Ahern<28l]. No estimate of a 
probability was attached to this scenario. The graphic 
depiction of these consequences generated a public 
reaction by groups of local citizens. The California 
legislature was influenced by this public reaction. 
One legislative staff member stressed that it was not 
possible to allow a site that would lead to a large 
number of deaths in a catastrophe.5 As a result, new 
siting regulations were passed stating that no more 
than an average of 10 people per square mile could 
be within one mile of the terminal and no more than 
60 within four miles of the terminal. The President's 
National Energy Plan incorporated similar popula-
tion guidelines which effectively ruled out any high 
density areas as candidates for an LNG terminal. 
This example illustrates how the context in which 
information is presented (e.g., a worst case scenario) 
may provoke strong reactions by interested parties 
and eventually lead to legislative changes. 
4. IMPROVING TIIE FACILITY SITING 
PROCESS: PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The above descriptive framework has revealed 
the set of difficult problems associated with the input 
5 This comment was made to John Lathrop in an interview in 
Sacramento, California, in July 1980, regarding the siting process 
of an LNG terminal. 
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and interaction phases of the facility siting process. 
In this section we will explore possible ways of im-
proving each of these phases of the decision process 
through more structured approaches. How successful 
these techniques are likely to be will vary with each 
specific problem and depends crucially on the result-
ing dynamics between the interested parties. 
4.1. The Input Phase 
Keeney<29l has shown how decision analysis can 
help structure the siting decision but has focused 
primarily on the perspective of a single decision-maker 
rather than on more than one interested party with 
conflicting objectives and different information bases. 
Yet many of the general concepts proposed by Kee-
ney are relevant for facilitating the input phase of our 
descriptive framework. It is particularly important to 
specify the set of decisions { D 1,. •• , Dn} that have to 
be made, how they relate to each other, and the 
relative importance each party gives to specific attri-
butes. 6 
Figure 2 is a representation of the interrelation-
ship between parties, attributes, and alternatives for 
one· decision, D2 . The figure is made up of three 
two-dimensional matrices. The upper left matrix re-
lates alternatives, sites A, B, C, or no site, with 
attributes: supply interruption risk, risk to life and 
limb, land-use environmental degradation, and finan-
cial cost, respectively. The cell entries range from 
- - , a very unfavorable outcome, to + +, a very 
favorable outcome. 
This matrix, as it is drawn, implies that either 
there is a supra decision-maker who has characterized 
each site with respect to its ranking with regard to 
different attributes or there is consensus among the 
different interested parties on these rankings. In real-
ity, there may be differences between how the rele-
vant actors perceive each of the proposed sites. Thus, 
industry might view the cost to society of having no 
site as being very unfavorable (as actually shown in 
Fig. 2). Local interest groups might have a different 
view on the subject. In this case, each of these inter-
ested parties would construct their own alternative-
attribute matrices. The shaded matrix on the lower 
left relates attributes to parties: government regulator 
(e.g., the CPUC or FERC), government coastal zone 
planner (e.g., the CCC), industry (e.g., the gas com-
6 See Keeney and Raiffa (41) for a more detailed discussion of 
techniques for assessing the value tradeoffs of a decision maker 
among several attributes. 
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Fig. 2. Relationship between parties, attributes, and alternatives. 
pany), societal interest group (e.g. , the Sierra Club), 
and local interest group (e.g., neighboring 
landowners), respectively. The cell entries range from 
no shading, indicating little or no relative concern 
with the particular attribute by the party, to dark 
shading, indicating a great deal of concern. The right 
matrix could have been generated from more quanti-
tative versions of the two left matrices. The cell 
entries reflect the relative rankings of each of the 
alternative sites by each of the interested parties. 
The value of developing a structured approach 
to the problem, such as the matrix developed in Fig. 
2 is that it points out differences between the parties. 
The diagram involves important simplifi_cations in 
that it does not consider possible uncertainties as to 
which outcomes will result if different alternatives are 
chosen. It also does not consider the types of decision 
procedures which each of the parties are likely to 
utilize in determining the relative rankings between 
alternatives. These issues are more appropriately dis-
cussed in the interaction phase, to which we now 
turn. 
4.2. Interaction Phase 
Suppose that at the end of the input phase, we 
were able to arrive at a set of matrices, such as the 
one depicted in Fig. 2, where each of the five differ-
ent interested parties had their own ranking between 
sites. One way to resolve differences would be to 
assign specific weights to each of the parties and 
choose the alternative which received the highest 
weighted score. This rather arbitrary way of resolving 
conflicts implies that there is some supra decision-
maker who has the authority to assign these weights. 
In reality, this is rarely the case. Instead, there is a 
process of bargaining, negotiation, and long-term de-
lays induced by this conflict as illustrated by the 
California siting process. Several approaches have 
been proposed for reducing these conflicts which may 
be useful here. 
4.3. The Analy!ic Hierarchy Process 
Saaty<3> has developed an approach for reconcil-
ing differences between parties. His analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) is a systematic procedure for repre-
senting the elements of a problem through a 
hierarchical structure. By decomposing the problem 
into its smaller consitutent parts one only has to 
make simple pairwise comparison judgments to de-
velop priorities in each hierarchy. 
To illustrate how a hierarchy might be con-
structed for the LNG siting problem, consider the 
illustrative example presented in Fig. 2. We have 
represented the problem of choosing an appropriate 
site in terms of a four-level hierarchy, as depicted in 
Fig. 3. The first level is the single overall objective: 
which LNG site (if any) to select? The second level 
specifies the set of five interested parties and then 
lists the attributes which are considered to be im-
portant to each of these groups (Level 3). The lowest 
level consists of the set of alternatives available at a 
given point in time. 
Priorities are established within each level of the 
hierarchy by assessing the relative importance of one 
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Fig. 3. Hierarchical structure for siting LNG facility. 
element over the other in a pairwise comparison with 
respect to the criterion in the next higher level. For 
example, the importance of each of the interested 
parties with respect to the others (Level 2) will be 
determined in reference to the question of siting a 
facility (Level 1). A measurement theory is used to 
determine the priorities of the hierarchy based on the 
judgmental data provided by the decision-maker(s). 
The potential success of the AHP for problems 
such as the siting of LNG facilities depends on the 
ability of the analyst to bring the relevant parties 
together, to elicit value judgments, and to reconcile 
differences between the different stakeholders with 
respect to assigning priority weights in pairwise com-
parisons. The LNG siting process in California re-
veals that each of the parties had their own objectives 
as well.as their own, possibly hidden, agenda. Some 
of the stakeholders may be reluctant to articulate 
their value structure for fear that they will lose some 
of their negotiating power as well as being publicly 
responsible for their positions. Ward Edwards<31 > en-
countered this latter problem in his study of evaluat-
ing school desegregation plans for Los Angeles. He 
noted that the interested parties in a societal decision 
problem are unlikely to reveal their value structure 
because this information then becomes public and 
groups would be accountable for numerical judg-
ments. Whether the Saaty approach can overcome 
this problem with respect to such emotionally charged 
issues as LNG siting is still an open question. Even if 
each party is willing to provide relevant pairwise 
comparisons it is not clear how one utilizes this 
approach when there are significant differences be-
tween the weights each of them assigns. 
4.4. Examining Assumptions 
One way to understand and possibly reconcile 
differences between parties is to have each of them 
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state the assumptions which they are utilizing in 
arriving at their conclusions. For example, industry 
would have to provide a rationale as to why it ranked 
site C as most desirable and the "no site" alternative 
as least desirable. Representatives of societal and 
local interest groups would have to defend their 
assumptions regarding their choices, which in this 
case were in the reverse order. Mitroff, Emshoff and 
KilmamP 2> have proposed this type of dialectical 
approach to planning, as a way for each of the 
interested parties to better appreciate the other's 
position and perhaps arrive at some compromise. 
Majone<33l also subscribes to such a process for deci-
sions like that of facility siting, where the knowledge 
base is so poorly understood that this type of open 
discussion is likely to improve everyone's understand-
ing of the problem. 
Since there is limited statistical evidence which 
one can utilize for defending one's position it may be 
possible to undertake some type of sensitivity analy-
sis to examine the consequences of changing specific 
assumptions. For example, suppose one is uncertain 
as to the magnitude of the methane cloud dispersion 
should there be a tank rupture of an LNG storage 
tank. By acknowledging this type of uncertainty and 
examining the consequences of locating plants in 
each of the three proposed locations, one can de-
termine how important differences will be in terms of 
favoring one site over another. Even if this type of 
analysis does not reconcile differences, it will at least 
indicate to all the concerned parties on what basis 
one alternative is preferred over another. 
4.5. Utilizing Interactive Computer Modeling 
If it is impossible to bring the different inter-
ested parties together, then other techniques may 
have to be used. One of the most promising ap-
proaches is the use of interactive computer modHs 
for scenario generation. Each interested party would 
be able to construct his/ her own scenario as to 
potential consequences of adopting one strategy over 
another, and determine the consequences of changes 
in assumptions of different parameters. The com-
puter terminal plays the role of a giant calculator by 
processing new data and displaying the resulting 
outputs. Having already constructed different 
matrices, such as the one that comprises Fig. 2, each 
stakeholder would be in a position to articulate the 
potential consequences of say, locating an LNG 
terminal at several proposed sites or deciding not to 
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construct a project. At this point, it would be possible 
to develop not only "worst case scenarios," but also 
less extreme situations, including the possibility that 
no accident occurs.7 
There undoubtedly will be differences between 
the way interested parties view the situation, but the 
advantage of interactive-computer models is that these 
differences can then be examined in some detail to 
stimulate discussion between the interested parties. 
For example, scenarios could be generated which 
would permit one to analyze very uncertain data 
(such as probability and loss information) to de-
termine their impact on relative rankings of sites. 
For example, suppose one estimated the annual 
probability of a severe accident to be between P 1 to 
P2 with losses ranging from L 1 to L 2• One could 
then develop scenarios which examine the relative 
merits of different alternatives as one changed these 
estimates. If specific sites were preferred over a wide 
range of values for probabilities and losses then this 
would simplify the choice process. If the rankings 
changed as P; and L1 were varied, then this would 
suggest that these estimates be refined if possible. 
5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The resolution of conflicts between interested 
parties may be extremely difficult even if one uses the 
more structured approaches proposed above. In fact, 
our descriptive framework suggests that interested 
parties may not want to get together to solve a 
particular problem unless they are forced to by exist-
ing legislation. Reconciliation of stakeholder conflicts 
is a time-consuming and threatening process since it 
involves detailed analysis on the part of each of the 
groups and acceptance of responsibility for one's 
actions. From a political standpoint, this may not 
always be the wisest thing to do. Hence, the above 
prescriptive suggestions can only be viewed as a 
starting point for developing a dialog between the 
parties. We need more research on designing policy 
instruments for reconciling differences between the 
vying groups. 
One of the critical questions that needs to be 
addressed is how to design mechanisms for control-
7 This approach differs from decision analysis by focusing on 
individual scenarios rather than a probability distribution over 
outcomes. For a more detailed discussion of interactive com-
puter models in a policy context see Kunreuther et al. (42). 
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ling uncertain and unknown consequences of a par-
ticular decision. For example, in the case of the siting 
of an LNG facility we have limited statistical evi-
dence to estimate probabilities and losses associated 
with a catastrophic accident and there is no experi-
mental laboratory except the real world from which 
to obtain such data. Holling< 18l points out that there 
are two extreme reactions to this concern with an 
unknown and uncertain future: regulation and pre-
diction. We have seen these two forces at work with 
respect to LNG siting in the form of new restrictions 
as to the location of a terminal regarding population 
density (regulation) and new design features of a 
terminal to prevent an accident (prediction). Interest-
ingly enough, these changes in siting procedures were 
triggered by exogenous events and crises and were 
designed to reduce the chances that an undesirable 
event would occur in the future. Holling< 18l noted 
similar reactions to a variety of environmental prob-
lems which he and his colleagues at the Institute of 
Resource Ecology (University of British Columbia) 
examined through case studies. 
Another area for future research is the design of 
policies to compensate parties at risk from the siting 
of a new facility. In the case of LNG there are many 
potential causes of an accident (e.g. , ships, tanks, 
etc.), so it may be difficult to attribute fault to any 
one party. Furthermore, the ships, the liquefied natu-
ral gas, and the terminals are owned by different 
subsidiaries and companies. The local, national, and 
international jurisdictions make legal problems even 
more difficult.<27l 
One possible direction for future study is the 
role of insurance as a way of protecting potential 
victims against potential property losses and physical 
injury. A General Accounting Office report of July 
l 978<34l concluded that injured parties could not be 
fully compensated for a serious accident under pre-
sent liability arrangements. What type of insura!lce 
arrangements are feasible between private firms and 
the industrial partners who are involved in the ship-
ping, storage, and transmission of LNG? What role is 
appropriate for government to play with respect to 
offering protection? The Price Anderson Act as it 
applies to nuclear safety may provide some guidance 
in the design of some system of liability which in-
volves joint private industry-federal government 
financial responsibility. 
With respect to the more immediate conse-
quences of siting a new facility, O'Hare<35l has pro-
posed a particular type of compensation scheme 
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whereby each community proposed as a potential site 
determines a minimum level of per capita compensa-
tion so that it is willing to make a legal commitment 
to have the project in their backyard if the compensa-
tion is paid. The applicant would utilize this com-
pensation as part of his calculations as to the relevant 
costs associated with locating the facilities in com-
munity A, B, or C. The final decision would then be 
made by the applicant taking into account the amount 
of compensation it would have to pay residents in 
each of these three localities. 
This type of system would only be applied to 
potential sites that had satisfied specific governmen-
tal criteria related to safety and environmental risk. 
O'Hare recognizes that there will still be some indi-
viduals in a given community who will be com-
pensated more than they need to be and others who 
will not be rewarded enough. He also recognizes that 
for such a system to be implemented there must be 
good information on the relevant costs, including an 
environmental impact statement, and that the system 
has to be designed to overcome the incentive to 
overbid. 
Whether or not some type of compensation 
scheme is a useful policy prescription depends on the 
specifics of the situation. In this connection, it would 
be interesting to ask what type of payments would 
have been required to appease the citizens of Oxnard 
so that an LNG terminal could have been located 
there. What would the Sierra Club require in pay-
ments so that they would support a site which might 
have adverse environmental effects? These questions 
can only be answered in a real world problem con-
text. They do reflect an increasing concern of 
economists and lawyers in dealing with windfalls or 
wipeouts from specific actions which involve the pub-
lic sector. Hagman and Misczynski<36l in their com-
prehensive study of the subject believe that windfalls 
should be partially recaptured to help compensate for 
wipeouts. They propose a number of alternative 
mechanisms for ameliorating this problem ranging 
from special assessments to development permits. 
These types of policy instruments could also be in-
vestigated in the context of specific siting problems. 
The final outcome is likely to represent some 
type of balance between the political constraints and 
economic criteria. As Wildavsky<37l has pointed out: 
The criterion of choice in politics and markets is not being 
right or correct as in solving a puzzle, but agreement based 
on interaction among partially opposed interests. (p. 133) 
Siting Hazardous Facilities 
The framework presented in this paper does not 
provide answers to the dilemma between economics 
and politics but it does help the analyst gain a better 
understanding of the causes of these conflicts. How 
one actually improves the process is a challenge for 
future problem-focused research. 
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